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In this paper we evaluate the impact of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 
on  U.S.  economic  growth.  We first calculate  effective  tax rates on 
income  from  capital  employed  in  corporate,  noncorporate,  and 
household  sectors.  We  then  project  the  future  growth  of  the  U.S. 
economy  with and without  the  1986 tax reform.  We find that much 
of  the  potential  gain  in  welfare  was dissipated  through  failure  to 
index  the income  tax base for inflation. The  most promising  avenue 
for future  reform  is to include  income  from household  assets in the 
tax base, while  reducing  tax rates on business  income. 
I.  Introduction 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  the  Tax  Re- 
form  Act  of  1986  on  U.S.  economic  growth.'  Major  tax  legislation 
such  as the  1986  tax  act can  produce  substantial  alterations  in the  rate 
of  capital  accumulation  and  the  allocation  of  capital  among  sectors 
and  types  of  assets.  An  assessment  of  the  impact  of  tax  reform  de- 
pends  not  only  on  the  changes  in  tax  policy  but  also  on  the  elasticities 
of  substitution  along  all the  relevant  margins.  The  intertemporal  mar- 
gin,  involving  the  allocation  of  resources  between  present  and  future 
' A detailed  description  of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 is given by the Joint Commit- 
tee on Taxation  (1986). The  economic  impact of the 1986 tax reform has been analyzed 
by the Office of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Department  of the Treasury  (1987) and in the 
symposium  edited  by Aaron  (1987). 
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consumption,  is essential  to the  evaluation  of  the consequences  of  a 
tax reform  involving  changes  in the treatment of income from capital. 
We conclude  that a fully  dynamic  model  of  the  U.S.  economy  is re- 
quired in assessing the impact of the tax reform on economic  welfare. 
Harberger  (1962,  1966) has argued that the U.S. tax system leads to 
a loss in efficiency  since it fails to impose a uniform  tax rate on income 
from capital in competing  economic  activities. There  have been wide 
gaps between  the rates of return on investment  before  and after taxes 
for  assets  employed  in different  sectors  and  differing  in durability. 
However,  the efficient  use of capital requires a uniform  tax rate only 
under  the restrictive assumption  that the allocation of capital is separ- 
able  from  the  allocation  of  other  resources  in  production  and  con- 
sumption.  In  a more  general  setting,  uniform  treatment  of  income 
from  capital is neither  necessary  nor sufficient  for efficient  resource 
allocation.2 
Harberger's  analysis of the impact of tax policy on the efficiency of 
capital allocation  is limited  to the allocation  of  a given  capital stock.3 
However,  saving behavior may be affected  by changes in tax policy, so 
that the  capital stock must be determined  endogenously  in order  to 
assess the economic  impact of tax reform.4  In addition,  the notion of 
efficient  resource  allocation must be extended  to encompass intertem- 
poral  allocation.  The  elimination  of  tax distortions  in the  intertem- 
poral allocation of resources  requires that income from capital should 
not be taxed at all. Taxes  on capital income could be replaced by taxes 
on  labor  income.  Alternatively,  income  taxes  could  be  replaced  by 
taxes on  consumption.5 
The  argument  for eliminating  capital income  taxes ignores the fact 
that distortions  in resource  allocation resulting  from these taxes must 
be replaced  by other  tax-induced  distortions.  For example,  the taxa- 
'2 For example,  in Sec. IV below we find that the equalization of tax rates on corporate 
and  noncorporate  capital considered  by Harberger  (1966)  actually reduces  efficiency. 
However,  we show that symmetrical tax treatment of income  from business and house- 
hold  assets is a very promising  avenue  for future  reform. 
3  An  alternative  to  the  Harberger  model,  which  focuses  on  the  incidence  of  the 
corporate  income  tax, is presented  by Gravelle and Kotlikoff  (1989).  Harberger's gen- 
eral equilibrium  approach  to the analysis of tax policy has been  greatly further  devel- 
oped  by Ballard et al. (1985).  The  economic  impact of the Tax Reform Act of  1986 has 
been  analyzed,  with an extension  of this model,  by Fullerton,  Henderson,  and Mackie 
(1987).  A recent  survey of the literature on applied  general equilibrium models for tax 
policy analysis is provided  by Whalley  (1988). 
4  The  literature  on  the  effect  of  taxation  on  saving is reviewed  by Summers  (1984) 
and Sandmo  (1985).  The  impact of the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986 on saving behavior is 
analyzed  by Hausman  and  Poterba  (1987). 
5  Proposals  for  the  implementation  of  a consumption  tax in the  United  States are 
discussed  by the  U.S.  Department  of  the Treasury  (1977),  Hall and Rabushka (1983), 
and Bradford  (1986).  Arguments  against a consumption  tax are presented  by the U.S. 
Department  of  the Treasury  (1984,  vol. 3). TAX  REFORM  Si 53 
tion  of  labor  income  has -important  implications  for  economic  effi- 
ciency  through  its effects  on  the  choice  between  labor  and  leisure. 
Labor  income  accounts  for  roughly  60  percent  of  U.S.  private  na- 
tional income  and a very substantial proportion  of U.S. tax revenues. 
It  is well  established  that,  even  though  the  price  elasticity of  labor 
supply  is  very  low,  there  is  a  substantial  substitution  effect  that  is 
similar in  magnitude  but  opposite  in  sign  to the  income  effect  of  a 
change  in  the  wage  rate.6  It is the  substitution  effect,  not  the  total 
price effect,  that is relevant  to the impact of a tax on labor income on 
economic  efficiency. 
In order  to evaluate  the  economic  impact of the  1986 tax reform, 
we  employ  a dynamic  general  equilibrium  model.  This  model  pro- 
vides a highly schematic representation  of the U.S. economy.  A single 
representative  producer  employs  capital  and  labor  services  to  pro- 
duce outputs  of consumption  and investment  goods. By modeling  the 
substitution  between  consumption  and investment  goods  in produc- 
tion, we are able to introduce  costs of  adjustment  in the response  of 
investment  to changes  in tax policy. We have simplified the represen- 
tation  of  technology  in  the  model  by introducing  a single  stock of 
capital at each point of time. This capital is perfectly malleable and is 
allocated so as to equalize after-tax rates of return to equity in the cor- 
porate,  noncorporate,  and  household  sectors. 
Our  model  also incorporates  a representative  consumer  that sup- 
plies labor services,  demands  consumption  goods,  and makes choices 
between  consumption  and saving.  This  model  of consumer  behavior 
is based  on an intertemporally  additive  utility function  that depends 
on levels of full consumption  in all time periods.  Full consumption  is 
an aggregate  of  consumption  goods,  household  capital services, and 
leisure.  To  simplify  the representation  of preferences,  we endow  the 
representative  consumer  with  an  infinite  lifetime  and  perfect  fore- 
sight about future  prices. We have fitted econometric  models  of pro- 
ducer  and consumer  behavior  to data for the U.S. economy  covering 
the  period  1947-86.7 
The  government  sector  of  the  U.S.  economy  raises  revenues 
through  taxes on  income  from  capital and labor services. Corporate 
capital income  is taxed  at both  corporate  and individual  levels,  non- 
6 The  elasticity  of  labor  supply  and  its implications  for tax policy are discussed  by 
Hausman  (1981,  1985). The  impact of the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986 on labor supply is 
analyzed  by Hausman  and  Poterba  (1987). 
7 See Jorgenson  and  Yun  (1986a)  for a discussion  of the model  and Jorgenson  and 
Yun (1986b) for an application  to earlier changes  in tax policy. The results presented  in 
these papers are based on econometric  models fitted to data covering the period  1955- 
80. Alternative  approaches  to dynamic general equilibrium modeling  of U.S. tax policy 
are presented  by Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff  (1987)  and  Goulder  and Summers  (1989). S154  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
corporate  capital  income  is  taxed  only  at  the  individual  level,  and 
household  capital income  is not taxed at either level. In addition,  the 
government  sector imposes  sales taxes on the production  of consump- 
tion  and  investment  goods  and  property  taxes on  assets held  by the 
business  and  household  sectors.  Taxes  insert  wedges  between  de- 
mand  and  supply  prices for investment  and consumption  goods  and 
for capital and labor services.  These  tax wedges  distort private deci- 
sions  and  lead  to losses in efficiency. 
In our model  the equilibrium  of the U.S. economy  is characterized 
by an intertemporal  price system that clears the markets for all four 
commodity  groups  included  in the  model:  labor and capital services 
and consumption  and investment  goods.  Equilibrium at each point of 
time  links  the  past and  the  future  through  markets  for  investment 
goods  and capital services. Assets are accumulated  as a result of  past 
investments,  while  the  prices of  assets must equal the present  values 
of future  capital services. The  time path of consumption  must satisfy 
the  conditions  for  intertemporal  optimality  of  the  household  sector 
under  perfect  foresight.8  Similarly, the time path of investment  must 
satisfy requirements  for  the  accumulation  of  assets by both business 
and  household  sectors. 
In  order  to  evaluate  alternative  tax policies,  we first consider  the 
intertemporal  equilibrium  associated with each policy. Under  perfect 
foresight  there is a unique  transition path to balanced growth equilib- 
rium  for  any  tax  policy  and  any initial level  of  capital. The  growth 
path of the U.S. economy  consists of a plan for consumption  of goods 
and leisure at every point of time by the representative  consumer  and 
a plan  for  production  of  investment  and  consumption  goods  from 
capital and labor services at every point of time by the representative 
producer.  These  plans are brought  into consistency  by the intertem- 
poral price system. 
Associated  with  each  tax  policy  and  the  corresponding  intertem- 
poral  equilibrium  is  a  level  of  welfare  for  the  representative  con- 
sumer.  This  level of  welfare  can be interpreted  as a measure  of eco- 
nomic  efficiency  corresponding  to the  potential  level  of  welfare  for 
society  as a whole.  The  actual  level  of  welfare  also depends  on  the 
distribution  of welfare  among  consuming  units. To  evaluate changes 
in tax policy in terms of  efficiency,  we translate changes  in potential 
welfare  into  an  equivalent  variation  in  private  national  wealth.  We 
first consider  the time path of the price of full consumption  associated 
with  current  tax  policy.  We  then  evaluate  the  difference  in  wealth 
required  to  attain  levels  of  potential  welfare  before  and  after  the 
change  in tax policy at prices prevailing  before  the change. 
8 Perfect  foresight  models  of  tax  incidence  have  been  presented  by  Hall  (1971), 
Chamley  (1981), Judd  (1987),  Sinn  (1987),  and many others. TAX  REFORM  S155 
This paper is organized  as follows.  In Section II, we summarize the 
1986  tax  reform  in  terms  of  changes  in  tax rates,  the  treatment  of 
deductions  from income  for tax purposes,  the availability of tax cred- 
its, and  provisions  for indexing  taxable income  for inflation.  We also 
summarize  proposals  for tax reform  that figured  prominently  in the 
debate  leading  up  to  the  1986  tax  act.  We  consider  proposals  ad- 
vanced  by the Department  of the Treasury  and by President  Ronald 
Reagan  in detail,  since these  proposals  were instrumental  in shaping 
the final legislation.  The  starting point for our discussion of the alter- 
native proposals  is the tax law in existence  prior to the 1986 reform. A 
number  of  important  features  of  the  pre-existing  tax  law  can  be 
traced  to tax reforms  in the early  1980s. 
In Section  III, we analyze the tax burdens  on capital income  under 
four alternative  tax policy regimes:  the tax law in existence  before  the 
1986  tax  reform,  the  Treasury  proposal,  the  president's  proposal, 
and the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986. We utilize the concept  of an effec- 
tive tax rate, which  summarizes  statutory  tax rates and provisions  of 
tax law that affect  the  definition  of  taxable income.  We also employ 
the  notion  of  a  tax  wedge,  defined  in  terms  of  differences  in  tax 
burdens  imposed  on  different  forms  of  income.  Tax  wedges  repre- 
sent gaps between  the marginal  products  of different  types of assets. 
These  gaps are useful  indicators  of  the likely impact of substitutions 
among  different  kinds of  capital induced  by changes  in tax policy. 
In  Section  IV  of  the  paper,  we analyze  the impact of  each of  the 
alternative  tax  policies  on  U.S.  economic  growth.  We  evaluate  the 
effects  of  changes  in tax policy on economic  efficiency  by measuring 
the corresponding  changes  in potential  economic  welfare. The  refer- 
ence  level of welfare,  which serves as the basis of comparison  among 
alternative  tax  policies,  is  the  level  attainable  by the  U.S.  economy 
under  the  tax  law  in  effect  prior  to  the  1986  tax  reform.  We  also 
analyze  losses  in efficiency  associated  with tax wedges  among  differ- 
ent kinds of capital income.  These  tax wedges are the consequences  of 
the  corporate  and  personal  income  taxes,  property  taxes,  and  sales 
taxes on  investment  goods. 
Section  V provides  a summary of the paper and presents our main 
conclusions.  We find that much of the potential  gain in welfare  from 
the  1986  tax reform  was dissipated  through  failure  to index  the in- 
come  tax base for inflation.  At rates of inflation  near zero the loss is 
not substantial.  However,  at moderate  rates of inflation, such as those 
prevailing  for  the  past decade,  the  loss is highly  significant.  Second, 
the greatest welfare gains would have resulted from incorporating  the 
income  from  household  assets into  the  tax base, while  reducing  tax 
rates  on  income  from  business  assets.  The  potential  welfare  gains 
from  an  income-based  tax  system,  reconstructed  along  these  lines, 
would  have  exceeded  those  from  a consumption-based  system. S 156  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
II.  Tax  Reform 
When  the Reagan administration  took office in 1981, there was wide- 
spread  concern  about  the  slowdown  in  U.S.  economic  growth.  Tax 
reform  proposals  by the administration  received  overwhelming  sup- 
port from the Congress with the enactment  of the Economic Recovery 
Tax  Act of  1981.9 The  1981 tax act combined  sizable enhancements 
in  investment  incentives  with  substantial  reductions  in statutory  tax 
rates for individuals  and corporations.  These  reductions  created  the 
prospect  of  rising  federal  deficits.  Only one  year later the  Congress 
passed  the  Tax  Equity and  Fiscal Responsibility  Act of  1982,  which 
repealed  the  provisions  of  the  1981  act  for  phasing  in  a more  ac- 
celerated  cost  recovery  system  for  property  placed  in  service  after 
1985 and reduced  the capital cost to be amortized over the lifetime of 
an asset. 
The  tax reforms  of  the  early  1980s substantially reduced  the bur- 
den  of  taxation  on  capital income.  However,  these  reforms  also in- 
troduced  important  nonneutralities  in  the  taxation  of  income  from 
different  sources.  Differences  in the tax treatment  of different  types 
of  assets gave  rise to concerns  in Congress  about the fairness  of  the 
tax system and the impact of tax-induced  distortions on the efficiency 
of  capital  allocation.  In  the  State of  the  Union  Address  in January 
1984,  President  Reagan  announced  that he had requested  a plan for 
further  tax reform  from  the Department  of the Treasury,  setting off 
a lengthy  debate  that resulted  in the  enactment  of  the Tax  Reform 
Act of  1986. 
In  describing  the  key features  of  the  1986  tax reform,  we find it 
useful  to begin  with a description  of the pre-existing  tax law in order 
to provide  a basis for  comparison.  The  main  provisions  of  the  1986 
tax act went into effect  on January  1, 1987.  However,  the investment 
tax credit  was repealed  for assets acquired after December  31,  1985. 
We  refer  to  the  pre-existing  tax  law as the  tax law of  1985  since  it 
remained  in  force  until  the  end  of  calendar  year  1985.  To  provide 
additional  perspective  on  the  objectives  of  the  1986  tax reform,  we 
also characterize  two alternative  tax reform  proposals  presented  by 
the Department  of  the Treasury  and the  president. 
A.  The 1985  Tax Law 
We  summarize  the  statutory  tax  rates  under  the  1985  tax law, the 
Treasury  and the president's  proposals,  and the  1986 tax act in table 
1. Column  1 gives  average  marginal  tax rates for  different  types of 
9 We  have  analyzed  the  impact  of  the  1981  tax act on  U.S.  economic  growth  in a 
previous  paper  (Jorgenson  and  Yun  1986b, esp.  pp.  365-70). TAX  REFORM  S 157 
income  under  the  1985 tax law for 0, 6, and  10 percent  annual infla- 
tion rates. The  tax rate on each type of income  is a weighted  average 
of  marginal  tax  rates  paid  by taxpayers  in  all income  tax brackets. 
Average  tax rates on  different  types of  income  reflect differences  in 
the  distribution  of  each  type  of  income  over  the  tax  brackets.  We 
present  rates for income  in the form of dividends  and other distribu- 
tions on corporate  and noncorporate  equity, capital gains accruing on 
corporate  and  noncorporate  equity,  and interest  on corporate,  non- 
corporate,  household,  and  government  debt.'0 
We  also  give  the  average  marginal  tax  rate on  labor income,  the 
average marginal tax rate on income  under  the corporate income tax, 
and the average tax rate under  the individual income tax. All tax rates 
include  taxes levied  at both federal  and state and local levels and take 
into  account  the  deductibility  of  state and  local taxes  at the  federal 
level. In projecting  U.S. economic  growth under  the 1986 tax law, we 
take as fixed  the  average  marginal  tax rates on  each type of  income 
and the average individual  income  tax rate. Tax revenues  received by 
the government  are generated  by applying  these  tax rates to streams 
of  income  generated  endogenously  within  our  model  of  U.S.  eco- 
nomic  growth. 
We summarize  the definition  of income  for tax purposes  under the 
1985 tax law in table 2. Section  1 describes the provisions for indexing 
the tax base for inflation.  The  1985 tax law included  no provisions of 
this  type.  Section  2  describes  provisions  for  deductibility  of  capital 
income.  Dividends  paid were  not deductible  from  corporate  income 
for tax purposes  under  the  1985 tax law. However,  85 percent of cor- 
porate  dividends  received  were  excluded  from  corporate  income. 
The  inside  buildup  of life insurance  companies  was not taxed under 
the  1985 tax law. Household  interest  expenses  were fully deductible 
from  income  at the  personal  level.  Only  40  percent  of  capital gains 
were included  in income  for tax purposes.  Finally, all state and local 
taxes  were  deductible  from  income  for tax purposes,  as indicated  in 
section  3 of  table 2. 
In  table  3 we  present  economic  depreciation  rates for  each of  51 
classes of assets distinguished  in the U.S. national income and product 
accounts.  We also give statutory rates of the investment  tax credit and 
tax  lifetimes  under  the  1985  tax law, the  Treasury  and  president's 
proposals,  and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  11 In panel  1 of table 4 we 
present  average  rates of the investment  tax credit and present values 
of capital consumption  allowances for short-lived and long-lived  busi- 
10 These  tax  rates are  based  on  detailed  simulations  of  the  Office  of  Tax  Analysis 
Individual  Income  Tax  Model  presented  by Cilke and Wyscarver (1987). 
l 1 The  statutory rates of the investment  tax credit and the tax lifetimes are based on 
the estimates  of  Fullerton,  Gillette,  and  Mackie (1987). TABLE  1 
TAX  RATES 
1.  AVERAGE  MARGINAL  TAX  RATES  OF  INDIVIDUAL  CAPITAL  INCOME 
Treasury  President's 
1985 Law  Proposal  Proposal  1986 Act 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
A. 0 Percent  Inflation 
Individual  income  accruing  to: 
Corporate  equity  .2555  .2261  .2240  .2029 
Noncorporate  equity  .2934  .2427  .2572  .2494 
Capital gains  accruing  to: 
Corporate  equity  .0303  .0596  .0325  .0562 
Noncorporate  equity  .0293  .0607  .0322  .0624 
Interest  income  accruing  to: 
Corporate  debt  .1533  .1452  .1532  .1285 
Noncorporate  debt  .1971  .1805  .1912  .1670 
Household  debt  .2717  .2252  .2387  .2310 
Government  debt  .2205  .1868  .1970  .1852 
B. 6 Percent  Annual  Inflation 
Individual  income  accruing  to: 
Corporate  equity  .2559  .2261  .2240  .2033 
Noncorporate  equity  .2934  .2427  .2572  .2494 
Capital gains  accruing  to: 
Corporate  equity  .0303  .0596  .0600  .0562 
Noncorporate  equity  .0293  .0607  .0643  .0624 
Interest  income  accruing  to: 
Corporate  debt  .1730  .1452  .1532  .1434 
Noncorporate  debt  .2151  .1805  .1912  .1807 
Household  debt  .2722  .2252  .2387  .2314 
Government  debt  .2260  .1868  .1970  .1894 
C.  10 Percent  Annual  Inflation 
Individual  income  accruing  to: 
Corporate  equity  .2560  .2261  .2240  .2034 
Noncorporate  equity  .2934  .2427  .2572  .2494 
Capital gains accruing  to: 
Corporate  equity  .0303  .0596  .0600  .0562 
Noncorporate  equity  .0293  .0607  .0643  .0624 
Interest  income  accruing  to: 
Corporate  debt  .1806  .1452  .1532  .1492 
Noncorporate  debt  .2222  .1805  .1912  .1861 
Household  debt  .2724  .2252  .2387  .2315 
Government  debt  .2282  .1868  .1970  .1910 TAX  REFORM  Si59 
TABLE  1 (Continued) 
2.  MARGINAL  TAX  RATES  OF  LABOR  INCOME,  CORPORATE 
INCOME,  AND  AVERAGE  PERSONAL  TAX  RATES 
Treasury  President's 
1985  Law  Proposal  Proposal  1986 Act 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Labor income  .2967  .2512  .2536  .2517 
Corporate  income*  .5084  .4006  .4006  .3847 
Individual  incomet  .1315  .1203  .1223  .1233 
3. TAX  RATES  HELD  CONSTANT  ACROSS  THE  ALTERNATIVE  TAX  POLICIES 
Property  tax rate: 
Corporate  assets  .0100 
Noncorporate  assets  .0096 
Household  assets  .0100 
Sales tax rate: 
Consumption  goods  .0579 
Investment  goods  .0579 
Personal  nontax  rate  .0229 
Effective  rate of wealth taxation  .0006 
NOTE.-Individual  income  accruing  to  household  equity  is equal  to income  accruing  to  noncorporate  equity. 
Capital gains  accruing  to household  equity  are equal  to zero. 
* Includes  federal  plus state and  local taxes. 
t The  Treasury  proposal,  the  president's  proposal,  and  the  1986  Tax  Reform  Act are assumed  to reduce  the 
average  tax rate of  individual  income  by 8.5  percent,  7.0  percent,  and  6.2  percent,  respectively. 
ness assets under  the  1985 tax law. Short-lived assets include all types 
of  producers'  durable  equipment  employed  in  the  business  sector. 
Long-lived  assets  include  residential  and  nonresidential  structures, 
land,  and  inventories. 
B.  The Treasury  Proposal 
In November  1984 the Treasury  Department  presented  a tax reform 
plan that became  known as the Treasury  proposal.  A principal objec- 
tive  of  the  Treasury  plan  was to  reduce  statutory  tax rates at both 
individual  and corporate  levels.  However,  the Treasury  plan was in- 
tended  to be "revenue  neutral," that is, to produce  the same revenue 
as the existing  tax system. 12 Lower statutory tax rates were to be offset 
by eliminating  a wide  range  of  tax preferences,  greatly broadening 
the  tax base.  In  addition,  the  plan  had  the  objective of  introducing 
12  See U.S.  Department  of the Treasury  (1984).  The  Treasury  plan and its relation- 
ship  to the  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986  are discussed  in detail by McLure and  Zodrow 
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TABLE  2 
INDEXING  AND  DEDUCTION  OF  CAPITAL  INCOME 
Treasury  President's 
1985  Law  Proposal  Proposal  1986 Act 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1. Indexing 
Long-term  capital gains*  .0  1.0  .0  (1.0)t  .0 
Interest  income  and interest 
expenses,  corporate  and 
noncorporate  sectors*  .0  INF/(.06  +  INF)  .0  .0 
Household  interest  payments  .0  .0  .0  .0 
2. Deduction  of Capital Income 
Dividends  paid  for corporate 
tax purposes  .0  .5  .1  .0 
Intercorporate  dividends 
received  .85  .50  .90  .80 
Fraction of  accrual-based 
taxation  of  life insurance 
company's  inside  buildup  .0  1.0  1.0  .0 
Household  interest  expenses  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Fraction of  long-term  capital 
gains taxed  as ordinary 
income  .4  1.0  .5  (1.0)t  1.0 
3. Deduction  of State and  Local Taxes 
Income  taxes  1.0  .0  .0  1.0 
Other  corporate  taxes  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Other  noncorporate  taxes  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Other  household  taxes  1.0  .0  .0  1.0 
* Equals  1.0 for complete  indexing. 
t Beginning  in 1991, instead of excluding  50 percent of long-term  capital gains, taxpayers have the option of  100 
percent  inclusion  and  complete  indexing.  We assume  that if inflation  is higher  than  6  percent,  taxpayers choose 
indexing. 
greater  neutrality  in  the  tax  treatment  of  different  types  of  assets. 
The  Treasury  proposed  to offset  the  decreased  progressivity  of  the 
rate  structure  by  curtailing  tax  preferences  heavily  used  by  high- 
income  taxpayers.  The  tax burden  for low-income  earners was to be 
reduced  through  increased  personal  exemptions  and  zero  bracket 
amounts  for household  heads. 
Under  the  1985 tax law the rate structure for the individual income 
tax  consisted  of  14  separate  tax  brackets,  with  statutory  tax  rates 
ranging  from  11 to 50 percent  of  taxable income.  Corporate  income 
was  taxed  under  a  graduated  rate  structure  with  a top  rate of  46 
percent.  The  Treasury  plan  proposed  to  replace  the  14 individual 
income  tax brackets with three  broader  brackets. Individual  income 
was  to  be  taxed  at  statutory  rates  of  15,  25,  and  35  percent.  The TAX  REFORM  Si6i 
reduction  of  statutory  income  tax  rates  was  expected  to  lower  the 
average  marginal  tax rate of individuals  by 20 percent  and the aver- 
age individual  tax rate by 8.5  percent. 
Column  2  of  table  1 shows  the  effects  of  the  Treasury  plan  on 
average  marginal  tax rates.  Under  the  central  assumption  of  6 per- 
cent  inflation,  the  average  marginal  tax rate on  income  from  equity 
would  have been  reduced  by 11.6 percent-from  25.59  to 22.61  per- 
cent-and  the  corresponding  average  marginal  tax rate on  interest 
from  corporate  bonds  would  have  been  reduced  by  16.1  percent- 
from  17.30 to 14.52 percent.  Finally, the average marginal tax rate on 
labor income  would  have been  reduced  by 15.3 percent-from  29.67 
to  25.12  percent.  These  reductions  in  average  marginal  tax  rates 
would  have  been  offset  by broadening  the  definition  of  taxable  in- 
come at both individual  and corporate  levels in order to achieve reve- 
nue  neutrality. 
Under  the Treasury  proposal  the tax base would have been broad- 
ened  by wholesale  elimination  of tax preferences  for individuals and 
corporations.  For example,  the deduction  for state and local income 
taxes would  have been repealed  and other state and local taxes would 
have  been  deductible  only  to  the  extent  that they  were  incurred  in 
income-generating  activity, as indicated  in table 2. Property taxes on 
owner-occupied  residential  real estate  would  not  have been  deduct- 
ible. Other proposed  changes  included  the taxation of unemployment 
compensation,  curtailment  of  the  tax deductions  for  mortgage  and 
other  personal  interest  expenses,  elimination  of  accelerated  capital 
cost recovery,  abolition of the investment  tax credit, taxation of inter- 
est  on  private-purpose  municipal  bonds,  accrual  basis  taxation  of 
earnings  on  life  insurance  policies,  recovery  of  intangible  drilling 
costs in the production  of petroleum  and natural gas through  amorti- 
zation rather  than immediate  expensing,  and many others. 
The  Treasury  proposal  included  extensive  provisions for indexing 
income  and  deductions  from  income  for  tax purposes  for  inflation. 
This  proposal  would  have retained  the indexing  of tax brackets, per- 
sonal exemptions,  and zero bracket amounts  from the  1981 tax act to 
prevent  the  upward  creep  of  tax brackets as a consequence  of  infla- 
tion.  In addition,  the  proposal  would  have indexed  capital gains, in- 
terest  expenses,  interest  income,  first in,  first out  (FIFO)  inventory 
accounting,  and  capital  cost  recovery.'3  Prior  to  the  tax  reform  of 
13  Deduction  of mortgage  and other  personal  interest would not have been indexed 
under  the Treasury  proposal.  Indexing  of interest income and interest expenses  would 
have been  based on the assumptions  that the real interest  rate is constant at 6 percent 
per year and that inflation raises the rate of inflation point for point. To the extent that 
the real rate of interest  deviates  from 6 percent,  the indexing  would have been incom- 
plete. 00  --- 
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S163 TABLE  4 
INVESTMENT  TAX  CREDIT  AND  TAX  DEDUCTION  OF  DEPRECIATION  ALLOWANCES 
CORPORATE  NONCORPORATE 
ANNUAL  RATE 
OF INFLATION  Short  Long  Short  Long 
1. 1985 LAW 
A.  Investment  Tax  Credit 
0 percent  .0945  .0423  .0954  .0056 
6 percent  .0944  .0426  .0953  .0057 
10 percent  .0944  .0427  .0953  .0057 
B.  Present  Value  of  Capital  Consumption  Allowances 
0 percent  .9223  .6347  .9204  .5529 
6 percent  .8755  .5569  .8714  .4609 
10 percent  .8469  .5156  .8416  .4143 
2.  TREASURY  PROPOSAL 
A. Investment  Tax  Credit 
0 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
6 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
10 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
B.  Present  Value  of Capital Consumption  Allowances 
0 percent  .8926  .4997  .8981  .3960 
6 percent  .9194  .5479  .9237  .4441 
10 percent  .9275  .5647  .9313  .4610 
3.  PRESIDENT'S  PROPOSAL 
A.  Investment  Tax  Credit 
0 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
6 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
10 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
B. Present  Value  of Capital Consumption  Allowances 
0  percent  .9471  .6142  .9490  .4843 
6 percent  1.0059  .7320  1.0058  .6487 
10 percent  1.0452  .8283  1.0437  .7925 
4. TAX  ACT  OF  1986 
A.  Investment  Tax  Credit 
0 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
6 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
10 percent  .0000  .0000  .0000  .0000 
B. Present  Value  of  Capital Consumption  Allowances 
0 percent  .9472  .5929  .9515  .4861 
6 percent  .8714  .4626  .8807  .3407 
10 percent  .8281  .4058  .8397  .2807 TAX  REFORM  S 165 
1986,  60  percent  of  net  capital  gains  were  excluded  from  income. 
With the indexing  of capital gains, this exclusion  could  no longer  be 
justified  as an  adjustment  for  inflation  and  would  have  been  elimi- 
nated. 
In  order  to  provide  relief  from  multiple  taxation  of  dividend  in- 
come,  the Treasury  proposal  would  have allowed  50 percent  of divi- 
dends  to  be  deducted  from  corporate  income,  as  defined  for  tax 
purposes.  The  proposal  would  have eliminated  multiple  taxation for 
intercorporate  dividends  by  excluding  50  percent  of  dividends  re- 
ceived by corporations  from taxable income.  About 40-50  percent of 
corporate  profits after taxes are distributed to the shareholders  in the 
form  of  dividends,  so that  these  provisions  would  have  significantly 
reduced  the  tax  burden  on  corporate  equity.  Column  2  of  table  2 
summarizes  the  key features  of the Treasury  proposal. 
Utilization  of  the  economic  concept  of  income  as the base for  in- 
come  taxation  requires  that capital cost recovery  must coincide  with 
economic  depreciation.  To  achieve  this objective  the  Treasury  pro- 
posal  would  have  classified  producers'  durable  equipment  into  five 
categories  and structures into two categories  by economic  lifetime.  In 
addition,  the  Treasury  proposal  would  have indexed  capital cost re- 
covery for inflation.  Panels  1 and 2 of table 4 show that at a high rate 
of inflation,  capital cost recovery under  the Treasury  proposal would 
have been more favorable than under  the  1985 tax law for both short- 
lived  and  long-lived  assets; the  reverse  is true at a low rate of  infla- 
tion.14 
C.  The President's  Proposal 
The  Treasury  tax reform  plan resulted  in a great public outcry, espe- 
cially among  taxpayers whose tax liabilities would have been adversely 
affected  by  the  elimination  of  tax  preferences.  However,  the  rate 
reductions  in the proposal attracted widespread  approval and consid- 
erable  public  support.  The  Reagan  administration  did  not  endorse 
the  Treasury  plan,  but  set  the  Treasury  staff  to  work on  a revised 
proposal,  duly  delivered  in  May  1985.'5  The  second  Treasury  tax 
reform  plan was endorsed  by the administration  and became  known 
as the  president's  proposal. 
The  president's  proposal  would  have  followed  the  Treasury  pro- 
14  In this calculation,  we have assumed  that the inflation  rate increases the  nominal 
interest  rate point  for point.  Thus  the after-tax  real interest  rate would have declined 
with  inflation  and  the  present  value  of  capital  consumption  allowances  would  have 
increased  with inflation  under  the Treasury  proposal. 
15  The  provisions  of  the Treasury  proposal,  the president's  proposal,  and the  1985 
tax law are compared  in U.S. Department  of the Treasury  (1985,  pp. 26-30,  chart 18). S166  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
posal  by  taxing  individual  income  in  only  three  tax  brackets  with 
statutory  rates of  15, 25,  and  35  percent.  The  president's  proposal 
would  also  have  raised  personal  exemptions  and  zero  bracket 
amounts  in order  to compensate  low-income  taxpayers for the loss in 
progressivity  of  the  tax  structure.  The  president's  proposal  would 
have  maintained  the  favorable  treatment  of  long-term  capital gains 
under  the  1985  tax law but  would  have  reduced  the  proportion  of 
capital gains excluded  from  income  from  60  to 50 percent.  In addi- 
tion,  beginning  in  1991,  taxpayers  would  have  had  the  option  of 
electing  exclusion  of  50 percent  of capital gains from income  for tax 
purposes  or  100 percent  inclusion  of  capital gains with complete  in- 
dexing. 
Under  the  president's  proposal  the corporate  tax rate would  have 
been  graduated  up to a top rate of  33 percent  and corporate  capital 
gains would  have been  taxed  at a lower rate of  28 percent,  as under 
the  1985  tax law. Column  3 of  table  1 shows  the impact of  the  pro- 
posal on average  marginal  tax rates. These  changes  would  have low- 
ered  the average  marginal  tax rates at the individual  level by 19 per- 
cent  and  the  average  individual  tax rate by 7 percent.  We find  that 
average  marginal  tax rates under  the Treasury  and  president's  pro- 
posals  are  similar,  except  that  the  tax  rates  on  interest  and  labor 
income  would  have  been  slightly  higher  under  the  president's  pro- 
posal.  16 
Like the Treasury  proposal,  the president's  proposal  was intended 
to  produce  the  same  tax  revenue  as the  1985  tax  law.  In  order  to 
offset  the  sharply  lower  statutory  tax rates, the tax base would  have 
been  broadened  by curtailing  or eliminating  tax preferences  at both 
individual  and corporate  levels.  In addition,  many preferences  favor- 
ing  high-income  taxpayers  would  have been  limited  or abolished  on 
grounds  of  fairness.  Important  changes  in the list of tax preferences 
would have included  the repeal of the investment  tax credit, repeal of 
the  deductibility  of  state  and  local  income  taxes,  and  accrual-based 
taxation of earnings  on life insurance  policies, as indicated in table 2. 
Unlike  the  Treasury  proposal,  however,  the  president's  proposal 
would  not  have  indexed  interest  income  and  expenses.  When  com- 
bined  with  the  option  of  indexing  capital  gains,  this  feature  of  the 
proposal  would have reduced  the cost of capital for projects with debt 
financing.  Another  implication  of  the  deduction  of  nominal  interest 
expenses  is apparent  in panel 3 of table 4. The  present value of capital 
consumption  allowances  for short-lived  assets is slightly greater than 
16 In table 1 we assume that the taxpayers would elect to be taxed on real capital gains 
when  inflation  is 0 percent  and 50 percent  of nominal  capital gains when  inflation is 6 
or  10 percent. TAX  REFORM  Si 67 
unity when inflation is 6 or 10 percent per year since the after-tax real 
interest  rate  becomes  negative  above  a certain  inflation  rate.17 The 
present  value for long-lived  assets in panel 3 of table 4 is smaller than 
unity only because  this category  includes  land and inventories  as well 
as depreciable  assets. 
In  order  to  alleviate  multiple  taxation  of  income  from  corporate 
equity, the president's  proposal would have allowed a deduction  of  10 
percent  of dividends  paid from corporate  income.  Double taxation of 
intercorporate  dividends  would have been eliminated by excluding  90 
percent  of  dividends  received  by corporations  from  taxable income. 
The  president's  proposal  would have had the same effect as the Trea- 
sury proposal  on the double  taxation of intercorporate  dividends  but 
would  have had less impact on double  taxation at corporate and indi- 
vidual levels.  Column  3 of table 2 summarizes  the specific provisions 
of  the  president's  proposal  pertaining  to  taxation  of  income  from 
capital. 
D.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
The  lengthy  debate  over  tax reform  was brought  to a conclusion  on 
October  22,  1986,  by enactment  of  the  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986.18 
The  main  provisions  of  the  new  tax law took  effect  on January  1, 
1987. The  1986 tax act preserved  many features of the Treasury  and 
president's  proposals.  The  final legislation  resulted  in sharply lower 
tax rates for both individuals  and corporations.  The  highest statutory 
tax  rate  for  individuals  was lowered  from  50  to  28  percent.'9  The 
corresponding  rate for corporations  was lowered  from 46 to 34 per- 
cent.  The  substantial  reductions  in  tax  rates  were  offset  by  sharp 
cutbacks in tax preferences  for both  individuals  and corporations. 
Column  4  of  table  1 shows  that  the  tax  reform  reduced  average 
marginal  tax rates on  various  types  of  income  in approximately  the 
same  proportion  as the  Treasury  and  president's  proposals.  For ex- 
ample,  at an annual  rate of  inflation  of  6 percent,  the average  mar- 
17  Under  our  assumption  that an increase  in the  rate of  inflation  would  result in a 
point-for-point  increase in the nominal  rate of interest, the after-tax real interest rate is 
(1  -  TQ)(io +  Tr)  -  rr,  where it is the real interest rate, ar  is the rate of inflation, and TQ 
is the corporate  tax rate. The  after-tax real interest rate is negative for an inflation rate 
above  (1  -  TQ)tO/TQ. 
18  The  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986  is described  by the Joint  Committee  on  Taxation 
(1986).  The  economic  impact of the  1986 tax reform  is discussed in detail by Musgrave 
(1987)  and  Pechman  (1987).  An  illuminating  account  of  the  tax  reform  debate  is 
presented  by Birnbaum  and  Murray (1987). 
19  Because  of  the  phaseout  of  the  15  percent  tax  bracket  and  the  personal  and 
dependents'  exemptions  for high-income  taxpayers, the top marginal rate is as high as 
33 percent  for certain ranges of taxable income.  Statutory tax rates under  the  1986 tax 
act were  higher  for the  transitional  year  1987. S168  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ginal tax rate on individual  income  from  equity was reduced  by 20.6 
percent-from  25.59  to 20.33-and  the average marginal tax rate on 
interest  income  from  corporate  debt was reduced  by  17.1 percent- 
from  17.30  to  14.34  percent.  The  reduction  in the corporate  income 
tax rate by 24.3 percent-from  50.84  to 38.47  percent-is  even more 
dramatic.  By contrast the average  marginal  tax rate on labor income 
was reduced  by only  15.2 percent-from  29.67  to 25.17  percent. 
The  magnitude  of  the  1986  reductions  in  statutory  tax  rates for 
individuals  and corporations  is very large. It is not surprising that the 
base for income  taxation  at both individual  and corporate  levels had 
to be broadened  very substantially in order  to achieve  revenue  neu- 
trality. Under  the  1985  tax law, individuals,  estates, and  trusts were 
eligible  for a 60  percent  exclusion  of  realized  net capital gains from 
taxable income.  Corporations  were taxed on capital gains at a rate of 
28  percent,  which  was lower  than  the  statutory  corporate  tax  rate. 
Under  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986,  the  60  percent  exclusion  of 
capital gains from taxable income at the individual level was repealed. 
All  corporate  capital  gains,  whether  long-term  or  short-term,  are 
taxed  at the statutory corporate  tax rate. 
In  spite  of  the  reduction  in  the  individual  income  tax  rates,  the 
accrual-based  average  marginal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  increased 
from  3.03  percent  under  the  1985 tax law to 5.62  percent  under  the 
Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986.  The  1986  tax  reform  did  not  include  a 
provision  for  excluding  dividend  payments  from  corporate  income. 
In  addition,  the  deductibility  of  dividends  received  by corporations 
was reduced  from  85  to 80  percent.  This  change  mainly affects  the 
tax  burden  on  corporate  equity  owned  through  life  insurance  and 
other  insurance  companies  and  has little  impact  on  the  overall  tax 
burden  on corporate  equity. 
The  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986 also repealed  the  10 percent  invest- 
ment  tax  credit  for  property  placed  in  service  after  December  31, 
1985.  Since  the credit  was applicable  mainly to investments  in short- 
lived business  assets, it had been  a major source of nonneutralities  in 
the taxation  of income  from different  types of assets. Panel 4 of table 
4 shows the differential  impact of the investment  tax credit on the cost 
of  capital  for  short-lived  and  long-lived  assets in the corporate  and 
noncorporate  sectors. Under  the  1985 tax law the average rate of the 
investment  tax  credit  in  the  corporate  sector  was 9.44  percent  for 
short-lived  assets and 4.26  percent  for long-lived  assets.20 The  repeal 
20  If capital cost recovery coincides  with economic  depreciation,  equality of effective 
tax rates requires  that the  investment  tax credit  must be greater  for long-lived  assets 
than  for short-lived  assets since short-lived  assets can take the credit more frequently. TAX  REFORM  Si69 
of  the  investment  tax credit  has substantially reduced  differences  in 
the tax treatment  of  different  types of  assets. 
Table  4  shows  that  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  increased  the 
present  value  of  capital consumption  allowances  for short-lived  cor- 
porate  assets  at low or  moderate  rates of  inflation  and  reduced  the 
present  value  for  high  rates of  inflation.  This  reflects  the  repeal  of 
investment  tax credit  since  the  basis of  capital cost recovery  was re- 
duced  by 50 percent  of the investment  tax credit under  the  1985 tax 
law.2'  Capital cost  recovery  was made  less rapid  for  producers'  du- 
rable equipment,  primarily  through  longer  tax lifetimes.  For struc- 
tures  the  adoption  of  longer  tax  lives  works  in the  same  direction, 
reducing  the  present  value of capital cost recovery. 
III.  Effective  Tax  Rates 
The  tax burden  on  capital income  can be summarized  by means  of 
effective  marginal  tax rates on  income  from  each  type of  assets. An 
effective  tax  rate  represents  the  complex  provisions  of  tax  law  in 
terms of a single  ad valorem  rate. This  tax rate is based on the social 
rate of return, defined  as income  per dollar of capital, adjusted for in- 
flation  and  depreciation  but not  for  taxes.  This  social rate of  return 
can be compared  with the corresponding  private rate of return, which 
excludes  all tax liabilities at both corporate  and individual levels. The 
effective  tax rate is defined  as the difference  between  the social and 
private  rates of  return,  divided  by the social rate of return.22 
21 If we adjust the present  value of capital consumption  allowances by increasing the 
basis for capital cost recovery  to  100 percent,  we find that the tax reform  reduced  the 
present  value of capital cost recovery  for short-lived  assets. To adjust capital consump- 
tion allowances under  the  1985 tax law for the effect of the provision reducing  the basis 
of capital cost recovery  by 50 percent  of the investment  tax credit, we can multiply the 
present value of capital cost recovery in table 4 under the  1985 law by 1/(1  -  0.5 ITC), 
where ITC is the rate of investment  tax credit in the same table. For example,  when the 
annual  rate of inflation  is zero, the adjusted  present value of capital cost recovery for a 
short-lived  corporate  asset is 0.9223/(1  -  0.5  x  0.0944)  =  0.9680,  which is larger than 
the corresponding  value,  0.9472,  under  the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986. 
22  The  definition  of effective  tax rates is discussed  in more detail in our earlier paper 
(Jorgenson  and  Yun  1986b, pp.  357-64).  The  effective  tax rates presented  below are 
based on the "traditional view" of corporate  finance discussed by Poterba and Summers 
(1983).  Effective  tax  rates  at the  corporate  level  have  been  compared  for  Germany, 
Sweden,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States for the  year  1980 by King and 
Fullerton  (1984).  These  effective  tax  rates  are  based  on  the  so-called  new  view  of 
corporate  finance.  The  literature  on  the  new  view  is surveyed  by Auerbach  (1983). 
Auerbach  (1987)  presents  effective  tax rates based on the new view for different  types 
of  assets  within  the  corporate  sector  under  the  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986.  Fullerton, 
Gillette, and Mackie (1987) give effective  tax rates under the  1986 tax act for both views 
of corporate  finance.  These  effective  tax rates differ because the  1986 tax act raises the 
statutory  tax rate on  capital gains and lowers corporate  and  individual  tax rates. S 170  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
To describe the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986, the pre-existing  1985 tax 
law, and the alternative  reform  proposals  presented  by the Treasury 
and  the  president,  we  utilize  effective  tax  rates  for  capital  income 
from three different  legal forms of organization-corporate,  noncor- 
porate,  and  household-and  from  short-lived  and  long-lived  assets. 
We also present  tax wedges  among  different  types of assets, defined 
as differences  between  social rates of return on these assets. We give 
tax wedges  for transfers  between  asset categories  within a sector, be- 
tween  sectors,  and  between  the  present  and  the  future.  We refer  to 
these  as interasset,  intersectoral,  and intertemporal  tax wedges.  The 
interasset  and  intersectoral  wedges  correspond  to  differences  be- 
tween  marginal  products  of  different  types of assets. 
In generating  effective  marginal tax rates and tax wedges  we have 
employed  parameters  describing  alternative  tax laws and tax reform 
proposals  from  tables  1-3.  In  addition,  we  have  set  the  values  of 
parameters  describing  the financial structure of each sector, the cor- 
porate  after-tax  rate  of  return  to corporate  equity,  and  the  rate of 
interest  at corresponding  averages  for  the  1967-86  period.  We as- 
sume that nominal  after-tax rates of return to equity are the same for 
all sectors and debt/equity  ratios are the same for all assets with each 
sector.  Property  tax rates are set at  1986  levels.  Finally, we have as- 
sumed  that an increase in the rate of inflation raises the nominal rate 
of  interest  point  for  point.23 
A.  The 1985  Tax Law 
We present  effective  tax rates under  the  1985 tax law in table 5. With 
a 6 percent  rate of  inflation,  these  rates were  2.4  percent  for short- 
lived  assets  and  44.4  percent  for  long-lived  assets  in the  corporate 
sector. The  difference  in social rates of return  between  the two asset 
classes  was  4.0  percent.  Transferring  one  dollar's  worth  of  capital 
from  short-lived  to  long-lived  assets  would  have  increased  the  na- 
tional income  in perpetuity  by four cents per year with no additional 
investment.  This  is a very substantial tax wedge,  comparable  in mag- 
nitude to the private rate of return, suggesting  that the potential gains 
23  The  validity of our assumption  that the debt/equity  ratio is the same for all assets 
within  each  sector  is debated  by Gordon,  Hines,  and  Summers  (1987)  and  Gravelle 
(1987).  Our assumption  that the nominal  interest rate before  taxes increases point for 
point with inflation is consistent  with the results of Summers (1983). King and Fullerton 
(1984)  employ  the  alternative  assumption  that  the  nominal  interest  rate  after  taxes 
increases point for point with inflation. Ballentine  (1987) lists a number of other impor- 
tant features  of the  1986 tax act that are not modeled  in effective  tax rate calculations, 
such  as those  we  present  below  and  those  given  by  Fullerton,  Gillette,  and  Mackie 
(1987).  They  provide  an assessment  of the sensitivity of their results to these omissions 
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from tax reform  were very large. These  gains approached  one dollar 
for each dollar transferred  as a consequence  of a change  in tax policy. 
The  provisions  of tax law interact with the rate of inflation in deter- 
mining  the tax burden  on capital income.  First, a higher  rate of infla- 
tion reduced  the present value of capital cost recovery under the 1985 
tax law since cost recovery was not indexed  against the impact of infla- 
tion.  Second,  taxation  of  nominal  interest  income,  coupled  with tax 
deductibility  of nominal  interest expenses,  reduced  the tax burden  as 
the rate of inflation increased.  For corporate  and noncorporate  assets 
the firm's marginal tax rate for the deduction  of interest expenses  was 
higher  than the individual's marginal tax rate on interest income.  On 
balance  the  tax  burden  on  corporate  and  noncorporate  assets  in- 
creased  with the  rate of  inflation.24 As the rate of  inflation  rose,  the 
tax burden  on  short-lived  assets increased  faster  than  that on  long- 
lived assets. As a consequence  the interasset tax wedge  declined  with 
the  rate of  inflation. 
Under  the  1985 tax law, assets in the noncorporate  sector had lower 
tax burdens  than corresponding  assets in the corporate  sector. Table 
5 shows that the effective  marginal tax rates for short-lived and long- 
lived  assets  were  -  15.2  and  31.2  percent,  respectively.  These  rates 
were  substantially  lower  than  the  corresponding  rates in the  corpo- 
rate sector. The  interasset  tax wedge  between  the short-lived and the 
long-lived  assets was 3.0  percentage  points.  Although  this tax wedge 
was smaller than that in the corporate  sector, the interasset tax wedge 
in the noncorporate  sector suggests  substantial opportunities  for po- 
tential gains  from  tax reform. 
A striking feature  of effective  tax rates in the noncorporate  sector 
under  the  1985  tax  law is that  the  effective  tax  rate on  short-lived 
assets was negative.  The  provisions  for capital cost recovery  and the 
investment  tax credit were so favorable that the tax system, in effect, 
provided  subsidies  to noncorporate  investment  in short-lived  assets. 
These  subsidies  took the form of a "tax shelter" that could be used to 
reduce  tax liabilities on other types of income.  The  effects of inflation 
on the tax burdens  and the interasset tax wedge  in the noncorporate 
sector  were  similar  to  those  in  the  corporate  sector.  Inflation  in- 
creased  the tax burden  on capital income  and reduced  the interasset 
tax wedge. 
The  value of capital services of household  assets, such as the rental 
equivalent  of  owner-occupied  housing  or the  services of  consumers' 
durables,  was not included  in taxable income  under  the 1985 tax law. 
24  Another  mechanism,  which we do not model,  is that firms using the FIFO inven- 
tory accounting  method  overstate their profits and hence their taxable income when in- 
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However,  effective  tax  rates  on  household  assets  were  affected  by 
provisions  of  the  individual  income  tax since payments  for personal 
and mortgage  interest  were deductible  and interest income  from the 
debt claims on household  assets was taxable. Like the assets in the cor- 
porate  and  noncorporate  sectors,  household  assets were  also subject 
to property  taxes. Table  5 shows that the effective  tax rate on house- 
hold  assets  was  12.7  percent  with  6  percent  inflation.  This  rate in- 
creased  slightly  with  inflation.  Since  the  income  from  household 
assets  was  not  taxable,  there  was  no  interasset  tax  wedge  in  the 
household  sector. 
Table  5 shows intersectoral  tax wedges  under  the  1985 tax law for 
short-lived  and  long-lived  assets.  When  the  rate  of  inflation  was  6 
percent  per year,  the  intersectoral  tax wedge  between  the corporate 
and  noncorporate  sectors  was 0.9  percent  for  the  short-lived  assets 
and  1.9 percent  for  long-lived  assets. The  wedges  between  the non- 
corporate  and  household  sectors  were  -  0.7  percent  for  short-lived 
assets and  2.3 percent  for long-lived  assets. The  wedges  between  the 
corporate  and household  sectors were 0.2  percent  for short-lived  as- 
sets  and  4.2  percent  for  long-lived  assets.  Unlike  the  interasset  tax 
wedges,  the intersectoral  tax wedges  tended  to increase with the rate 
of  inflation  since  the tax burden  of  corporate  assets increased  faster 
than that of noncorporate  assets, which in turn increased  faster than 
that of  household  assets. 
B.  The Treasury  Proposal 
Effective  marginal  tax  rates  on  business  assets  under  the  Treasury 
proposal  are given  in table 6. These  rates are similar to those  under 
the  1985  tax  law. A  comparison  of  tables  5 and  6 reveals  that at 6 
percent  inflation  the Treasury  proposal  would  have slightly reduced 
the  effective  marginal  tax rate from  35.9  to 35.1  percent  for corpo- 
rate  assets  and  from  29.3  to  27.1  percent  for  noncorporate  assets. 
Since the  1985 tax law did  not index  taxable income  and tax deduc- 
tions, the Treasury  proposal would have increased the tax burden at a 
lower  rate of  inflation  but would  have decreased  it at a higher  infla- 
tion  rate. 
The  effective  marginal  tax rates under  the  Treasury  proposal  re- 
flect the combined  effects  of  the repeal  of  investment  tax credit, the 
introduction  of  economic  depreciation,  lowering  of  statutory  tax 
rates, and indexing  of interest  income,  interest expenses,  and capital 
gains.  Of the  many tax policy changes  in the Treasury  proposal,  the 
repeal of investment  tax credit would have had the greatest impact on 
effective  tax rates on  income  from  capital. Since short-lived  business 
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tax credit  under  the  1985  tax law, the increase  in the tax burden  on 
short-lived  assets  under  the  Treasury  proposal  would  have  been 
most marked. 
The  objectives of the Treasury  proposal were to reduce tax wedges 
among  different  forms  of  investment  and  insulate  the  tax structure 
from  the  impact  of  inflation.  We  find  that  the  Treasury  proposal 
would  have  reduced  interasset  tax  wedges  substantially.  Under  the 
1985 tax law with 6 percent  inflation,  the tax wedges  between  short- 
lived  and  long-lived  assets  were  4.0  percent  in the  corporate  sector 
and  3.0  percent  in the  noncorporate  sector.  They  would  have been 
reduced  to only  1.2 percent  and  0.6 percent,  respectively,  under  the 
Treasury  proposal.  To the extent  that the welfare cost of a tax distor- 
tion  increases  with  the  tax  wedge,  reductions  in  the  interasset  tax 
wedges  of this magnitude  would have significantly improved  the effi- 
ciency  of capital allocation  within  each sector. 
Second,  the  Treasury  proposal  would  have  substantially  reduced 
the  intersectoral  tax wedges  for  long-lived  assets, in part because  of 
the  elimination  of  property  tax  deductions,  but  would  have  had 
mixed  effects  for  short-lived  assets.  The  impact  of  the  proposal  on 
intersectoral  tax wedges  for short-lived  assets would  have depended 
on  the  rate  of  inflation.  The  Treasury  proposal  would  have  been 
relatively  ineffective  in  eliminating  the  substantial  intersectoral  tax 
wedges  for  long-lived  assets under  the  1985  tax law since long-lived 
assets  would  have  borne  a heavier  tax burden  than  the  short-lived 
assets under  the  proposal.  In  addition,  corporate  assets would  have 
been  more  heavily  taxed  than  noncorporate  assets,  which,  in  turn, 
would  have been  more  heavily taxed  than household  assets. 
Third,  the repeal of investment  tax credit would have increased the 
tax burden  roughly  as much as the reduction  of the statutory tax rates 
would  have decreased  it at a 6 percent  rate of inflation. The  average 
effective  tax rate for the entire  corporate  sector would have changed 
only  from  35.9  percent  to  35.1  percent  and  the  intertemporal  tax 
wedge  would  have increased  slightly from 2.9 percent  to 3.0 percent. 
The effect  of the repeal of investment  tax credit is seen most clearly in 
the case of the short-lived  business assets. At a 6 percent rate of infla- 
tion, the effective  tax rate on short-lived  corporate  assets would have 
increased  from 2.4 percent  under  the  1985 law to 28.0 percent under 
the Treasury  proposal,  and the intertemporal  tax wedge  would have 
increased  from 0.1 percent  to 2.1 percent. The  pattern is reversed for 
long-lived  assets since the intertemporal  tax wedges would have been 
smaller  under  the Treasury  proposal. 
Finally, the  Treasury  proposal  would  have  reduced  the  impact of 
inflation  on  the  tax  burden  on  capital  income  by  defining  taxable 
income  to approximate  economic  income more closely. In fact, the tax S176  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
burden  would  have  declined  with  inflation  because  of  incomplete 
indexing  of  interest  payments.25  To  the  extent  that  interest  is not 
completely  indexed,  inflation tends to increase the after-tax real inter- 
est  rate and  reduce  the  present  value  of  capital consumption  allow- 
ances, even if tax depreciation  is completely  indexed  against inflation. 
On  the  other  hand,  incomplete  indexing  reduces  the  cost  of  debt 
financing.  Table  6  indicates  that  the  result  of  these  two  opposing 
effects  would  have been  to reduce  the marginal tax burden  of capital 
with higher  rates of  inflation. 
C.  The President's  Proposal 
We summarize  effective  tax rates under  the  president's  proposal  in 
table  7.  Overall,  the  effects  of  the  president's  proposal  would  have 
been  similar  to those  of  the  Treasury  proposal.  The  tax burden  on 
income  from  capital would  have  increased  at a low rate of  inflation 
and decreased  at a high rate. The  interasset tax wedges  in the corpo- 
rate and noncorporate  sectors would have been reduced;  the intersec- 
toral tax wedges  of  long-lived  assets would  also have been  reduced, 
but  effects  on  the  tax  wedges  for  the  short-lived  assets would  have 
been  mixed.  However,  a careful comparison  of tables 6 and 7 reveals 
a number  of subtle differences  between  the Treasury  and president's 
proposals,  many of which are attributable to differences  in the impact 
of  inflation  on  the tax system. 
With no  inflation  the  president's  proposal  would  have been  more 
favorable  to  investment  since  it  would  have  retained  accelerated 
schedules  for capital cost recovery.  At 6 or  10 percent  inflation rates, 
the  president's  proposal  would  have  been  even  more  favorable  to 
investment  since  the  indexing  of  capital  consumption  allowances 
would  have been  coupled  with the deduction  of nominal  interest ex- 
penses.  This  would  have  increased  the  present  value of capital con- 
sumption  allowances at higher  rates of inflation. In addition,  inflation 
would have lowered  the tax burden  on capital as a consequence  of the 
tax deductibility  of nominal interest expenses.  The value of the result- 
ing deductions  would have been greater than the additional tax liabili- 
ties  resulting  from  the  taxation  of  nominal  interest  income  at  the 
individual  level.  Similar reasoning  can be applied  to explain  the de- 
cline  of  the  intersectoral  tax wedges  with inflation. 
Under  the  1985  tax law and  the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986, capital 
cost recovery is not indexed  for inflation, so that an increase in the in- 
25  We assume  that the  real interest  rate is 3.57  percent  as opposed  to the 6 percent 
used  in  the  proposal.  Under  our  assumptions,  interest  income  and  expenses  would 
have  been  incompletely  indexed  and  inflation  would  have had an impact on effective 
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flation rate adds to the tax burden  on income  from capital. Under  the 
Treasury  proposal,  the  recovery  of  capital cost would  have been  in- 
dexed  and  interest  would  have  been  indexed  incompletely.  There 
would  have  been  a  slight  tendency  for  the  tax  burden  on  capital 
income  to  decline  with  inflation.  This  tendency  would  have  been 
strengthened  under  the president's  proposal  since capital cost recov- 
ery  would  have  been  indexed,  while  interest  deductions  would  not. 
Tables  6 and  7 show  that the  president's  proposal  would  have  nar- 
rowed the intersectoral  tax wedges  relative to the Treasury  proposal. 
By contrast the Treasury  proposal would have had uniformly  smaller 
interasset  tax wedges. 
D.  The Tax Reform  Act of 1986 
Since the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986 embraced  many of the ideas con- 
tained  in  the  Treasury  and  president's  proposals,  the  impact of  the 
tax reform  on  effective  tax rates and tax wedges  is similar to that of 
the two proposals.  Table  8 shows that the repeal of the investment  tax 
credit more than offset  the reduction  in the statutory tax rates, so that 
the  overall  tax burden  on  income  from  capital is increased.  Despite 
the  acceleration  of  capital  cost  recovery  and  lower  marginal  tax 
rates, the impact of repeal of the investment  tax credit is most evident 
in the increase  of  the tax burden  on short-lived  business  assets. At 6 
percent  inflation,  the  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986 imposes  an effective 
tax rate on  short-lived  assets of  38.2  percent  in the corporate  sector 
and 28.2 percent  in the noncorporate  sector, while the corresponding 
tax rates were 2.4 percent and  -  15.2 percent under the  1985 tax law. 
For long-lived  assets, effective  tax rates were not much affected  by 
tax reform.  The  effects  of lower tax rates were approximately  offset 
by the  combined  effects  of  the  longer  cost recovery  period  and  the 
repeal of the investment  tax credit. At 6 percent inflation, the interas- 
set tax wedges  in the corporate  and noncorporate  sectors are only  1.0 
percent  and  0.6  percent,  while  the  corresponding  figures  were  4.0 
percent  and 3.0 percent,  respectively,  under the 1985 tax law. Table 8 
shows that the effective  tax rates on household  assets were essentially 
unaffected  by the  reform  since  the  difference  between  the  average 
marginal  tax rates on  equity  and  debt claims was almost unchanged 
and  property  taxes  remained  the same. 
Overall,  the  tax burden  on  the income  from  capital was increased 
by  the  1986  tax  reform.  As  a  consequence,  the  intertemporal  tax 
wedges  are larger and the efficiency  of intertemporal  resource alloca- 
tion  was  adversely  affected.  On  the  other  hand,  the  interasset  tax 
wedges  were  considerably  reduced  and  the  efficiency  of  interasset 
capital allocation  was enhanced.  At 6 percent  inflation,  intersectoral obC 
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wedges  were increased  for short-lived  assets and decreased  for long- 
lived  assets. 
The  1986  tax  reform  did  not  incorporate  the  indexing  of  capital 
income  taxation  provided  in the Treasury  proposal.  The  impacts of 
inflation on effective  tax rates and tax wedges  under  the Tax Reform 
Act  of  1986  are  similar  to  those  under  the  1985  tax  law.  The  tax 
burden  on income  from capital increases with inflation. Since the tax 
burden  on short-lived  assets rises faster than that on long-lived  assets, 
interasset  tax wedges  decline  with the rate of inflation.  The  tax bur- 
den  on  corporate  assets  increases  faster  than  that on  noncorporate 
assets, which in turn increases faster than that on household  assets, so 
that intersectoral  tax wedges  increase  with the rate of inflation. 
IV.  Economic  Growth 
In this section  we estimate  the impact of alternative tax policies-the 
Treasury  proposal,  the president's  proposal,  and the Tax Reform Act 
of  1986-on  U.S. economic  growth. We evaluate the effect  of each of 
the alternative  tax reform  proposals  by comparing  the resulting  level 
of welfare with that attainable under  the "base case" given by the 1985 
tax law. Since effective  tax rates and tax wedges depend  on the rate of 
inflation,  we consider  three  alternative rates of inflation: 0, 6, and  10 
percent.  In  these  comparisons  we  impose  the  requirement  that the 
revenue  and  expenditure  of  the  government  sector  are the same as 
those  in the base case. 
We consider  four alternative methods  for adjusting tax revenues  in 
order  to  keep  the  budgetary  position  of  the  government  sector  the 
same  as  that  in  the  base  case.  The  first  method  is  to  increase  or 
decrease  government  revenues  by  means  of  a  "lump-sum"  tax  or 
subsidy.  We model  a lump-sum  tax by altering the budget  constraint 
facing  the  representative  consumer.  A tax results in a contraction  of 
the budget  available to the consumer  and a corresponding  increase in 
government  revenue.  Similarly, a subsidy expands  the budget  avail- 
able  to  the  consumer  and  decreases  government  revenue.  A  lump- 
sum  tax  or  subsidy  does  not  distort  decisions  in  the  household  or 
business  sector of  the economy  by altering  the tax wedges  facing the 
representative  consumer  or the  representative  producer. 
We  also  consider  three  methods  for  adjusting  government  reve- 
nues  that involve  changes  in tax-induced  distortions.  These  include 
proportional  adjustments  to labor income  taxes, sales taxes on invest- 
ment  and consumption  goods,  and taxes on income  from both capital 
and  labor.  The  labor income  tax adjustment  affects  the  tax rate for 
labor services,  the  sales tax adjustment  affects  the  tax rates for con- 
sumption  and  investment  goods,  and the  income  tax adjustment  af- TAX  REFORM  Si8i 
TABLE  9 
WELFARE  EFFECTS  OF TAX  REFORM  (Billions of  1987 Dollars) 
1985  Treasury  President's  1986 
Revenue  Adjustment  Tax  Law  Proposal  Proposal  Tax  Act 
0 Percent  Inflation 
Lump-sum  tax  724.0  1,489.6  1,691.4  1,561.8 
Labor income  tax  478.2  1,468.8  1,642.4  1,565.0 
Sales tax  400.3  1,452.9  1,614.6  1,558.7 
Individual  income  tax  374.5  1,456.1  1,619.1  1,563.1 
6 Percent  Inflation 
Lump-sum  tax  0.0  1,907.6  2,452.2  448.4 
Labor income  tax  0.0  1,711.4  2,170.4  746.9 
Sales tax  0.0  1,600.1  2,104.9  901.2 
Individual  income  tax  0.0  1,595.8  2,007.9  999.4 
10 Percent  Inflation 
Lump-sum  tax  -477.1  2,060.4  3,015.6  -200.8 
Labor income  tax  -333.7  1,791.6  2,584.7  267.3 
Sales tax  -285.2  1,623.5  2,356.4  517.0 
Individual  income  tax  -221.9  1,604.8  2,353.1  748.6 
NOTE  -The  1987 national wealth (beginning  of the year) and gross national product were $15,920.2  billion and 
$4,488.5  billion. 
fects the tax rates for both capital and labor services. By considering 
all three  methods,  we are able to assess the  sensitivity of  the welfare 
rankings  of  alternative  tax policies  to changes  in the constraints  im- 
posed  by the requirement  of  revenue  neutrality. 
A.  The Impact of Tax Reform 
We summarize  the results of our simulations of U.S. economic  growth 
under  alternative  tax policies  in table 9. An important  conclusion  we 
can draw from the table is that the Treasury  proposal,  the president's 
proposal,  and  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  all  improve  potential 
economic  welfare  substantially.  In our central case with 6 percent  in- 
flation  and  a  lump-sum  tax  adjustment,  the  president's  proposal 
would  have  generated  a welfare  gain  of  $2,452.2  billion,  while  the 
Treasury  proposal  would  have  generated  a gain of  $1,907.6  billion. 
However,  the  welfare  gain  associated  with  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of 
1986  is only  $448.4  billion.26 
With no change  in government  expenditures  the Tax  Reform  Act 
of  1986 results in more revenue  than is necessary to keep the govern- 
26  These  welfare  gains are measured  in  1987 dollars. S182  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ment  in the  same  budgetary  position  as under  the  1985  tax law. In 
order  to leave government  revenue  the same under  the two tax poli- 
cies, tax revenues  must be rebated to the household  sector. Replacing 
the  lump-sum  tax  adjustment  with  a  distortionary  tax  adjustment 
lowers the rates of the distortionary  taxes involved  and improves  the 
performance  of the economy  under the 1986 tax reform.  By contrast, 
the  Treasury  and  the  president's  proposals  would  have  resulted  in 
less  revenue  than  the  1985  tax  law.  The  welfare  gains  would  have 
been  smaller under  the distortionary  tax adjustments  than under  the 
lump-sum  tax adjustment. 
Another  perspective  on the economic  impact of the alternative tax 
reform  proposals  is provided  by a comparison  of  the  welfare  gains 
from  tax  reform  with  private  national  wealth.  The  nominal  value 
of  the  U.S.  private  national  wealth  at  the  beginning  of  1987  was 
$15,920.2  billion.  Making  use  of  this  figure,  we  estimate  that  the 
welfare  gains from the Treasury  and the president's  proposals would 
have  been  equivalent  to increases  of  12.0 and  15.4  percent,  respec- 
tively,  of  U.S.  private  national  wealth  in  1987.27 The  welfare  gain 
from the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986 is equivalent  to an increase of only 
2.8  percent  of  the  national  wealth. 
Under  distortionary  tax adjustments  the welfare  gains would  have 
been  somewhat  smaller  for  the  president's  proposal  and  slightly 
smaller for the Treasury  proposal.  The  gains are substantially larger 
for the  1986 Tax  Reform  Act. However,  these gains are not sensitive 
to the  differences  among  the  distortionary  tax adjustments.28 If we 
consider  a sales  tax  adjustment  with  a 6  percent  inflation  rate,  the 
welfare  gains would  have been  $1,600.1  billion for the Treasury  pro- 
posal  and  $2,104.9  billion  for  the  president's  proposal.  These  gains 
would have totaled  10.1 and  12.3 percent of the U.S. private national 
wealth in  1987.  The  corresponding  welfare  gain is $901.2  billion for 
the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986. This  is equivalent  to 5.7 percent  of the 
national  wealth. 
Table  9  also  shows  how  the  welfare  effects  of  alternative  tax re- 
forms  would  be affected  by the rate of  inflation.  It is useful  to focus 
on  lump-sum  tax  adjustments  since  distortionary  tax  adjustments 
result  in  reallocations  of  resources  due  to  substitutions  as  well  as 
changes  in  the  rate  of  inflation.  Economic  welfare  would  have  in- 
27  In interpreting  these comparisons  in terms of the U.S. private national wealth, one 
should  bear in mind  that the private national  wealth includes  only nonhuman  wealth, 
while the welfare gains from tax reform  accrue to the owners of nonhuman  capital and 
also to recipients  of labor income,  which can be regarded  as a return to human capital. 
28  This  does  not  imply  that the  distortionary  effects  of  the  taxes  used  for revenue 
adjustments  are similar. Rather it reflects the fact that the size of the required  revenue 
adjustments  is not large  enough  to produce  sizable differences. TAX  REFORM  S 183 
creased with higher  inflation under  the Treasury  and president's pro- 
posals.  On  the other  hand,  welfare  declines  with inflation  under  the 
1985 tax law and the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986. The  reason is that the 
tax burden  on  capital income  would  have been  reduced  with higher 
inflation  under  the  two  proposals,  while  inflation  increases  the  tax 
burden  on  capital  income  under  the  1985  tax law and  Tax  Reform 
Act of  1986. 
An increase  in the rate of inflation  from  0 to 6 percent  is sufficient 
to alter the welfare  ranking  between  the  Treasury  proposal  and  the 
Tax Reform  Act of  1986. The  welfare gains from the 1986 tax reform 
are  substantially  attenuated  at  a  6  percent  inflation  rate.  At  a  10 
percent  inflation  rate, these  gains are further  reduced.  Our first con- 
clusion  is that  potential  gains  in  welfare  from  the  1986  reform  are 
largely  dissipated  at moderate  rates  of  inflation,  such  as those  that 
have  prevailed  for  the  past  decade.  Insulating  the  U.S.  tax  system 
from  the  impact  of  inflation  should  retain  high  priority  in  future 
deliberations  about  tax reform. 
B.  Alternative  Approaches  to Tax Reform 
We  have  measured  the  impact  of  the  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986  on 
economic  welfare,  employing  the  1985 tax law as a basis for compari- 
son. We have also assessed  the potential  impact of the Treasury  and 
president's  tax  reform  proposals.  We  next  consider  alternative  ap- 
proaches  to tax reform  based on the elimination  of tax wedges among 
different  types of assets. As before,  the growth path of the U.S. econ- 
omy  under  the  1985  tax law is taken  as a basis for comparison.  We 
measure  the potential  gains in economic  welfare  from changes  in tax 
policy by comparing  the  resulting  levels of welfare  with those  corre- 
sporiding  to the  1985  tax law. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  analysis  we  find  it useful  to  distinguish 
between  atemporal  and intertemporal  tax wedges.  The  elimination  of 
an atemporal  tax wedge  requires  that the social rates of return on the 
corresponding  assets  are  equalized  within  a given  time  period.  We 
eliminate  atemporal  tax wedges  among  assets by equalizing  the corre- 
sponding  social rates of return at a weighted  average of these rates of 
return,  where  stocks of assets are used as weights.  More precisely, we 
equalize  social rates of  return  associated  with balanced  growth  equi- 
librium  under  the  1985  tax law, using  the  balanced  growth  propor- 
tions of  assets as weights. 
To  model  the  integration  of  the  corporate  and  individual  income 
taxes,  we  set  the  social  rates  of  return  on  corporate  assets equal  to 
those on the corresponding  noncorporate  assets. This procedure  does 
not affect  the private rates of return  in the two sectors, so that effec- S184  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
tive tax rates are not equalized  between  the sectors. The  private rates 
of return on assets in different  sectors differ for two reasons. The first 
is that debt/asset  ratios differ  across sectors. The  second  is that aver- 
age marginal tax rates on individual income vary from sector to sector 
because  of  the  differences  in  the  distribution  of  asset  ownership 
among  taxpayers  in different  income  tax brackets. 
We consider  the elimination  of five sets of tax wedges:  (1) interasset 
tax  wedges  within  the  corporate  and  noncorporate  sectors;  (2)  in- 
tersectoral tax wedges  between  assets of the same type held in the cor- 
porate  and noncorporate  sectors; (3) intersectoral  tax wedges  among 
assets of  the  same  type  held  in the  business  and  household  sectors, 
where  the business  sector includes  both corporate  and noncorporate 
business;  (4) all atemporal  tax wedges  in the business  sector; and (5) 
all atemporal  tax wedges  in the business  and  the household  sectors. 
We also consider  (6) the  integration  of  corporate  and  noncorporate 
taxes. 
Elimination  of  an intertemporal  tax wedge  requires equalizing  the 
social and private rates of return,  so that the effective  tax rate on the 
corresponding  assets  is reduced  to  zero.  We  consider  two  possible 
approaches  to eliminating  intertemporal  tax distortions. First, we con- 
sider  (7) the elimination  of  intertemporal  tax wedges  resulting  from 
income  and  property  taxes.  This  leaves  the  sales tax on  investment 
goods  at its level in the base case while reducing  the effective  tax rate 
on  capital  income  to  zero.  Second,  we  eliminate  the  tax burden  on 
capital altogether  by (8) removal of the sales tax on investment  goods 
as well as taxes on income  from capital and property taxes. These  two 
approaches  correspond  to alternative  implementations  of  consump- 
tion tax rules  for  the taxation  of capital income. 
We summarize  the sums of the investment  tax credit and the pres- 
ent value of tax deductions  for capital cost recovery that result in the 
elimination  of tax wedges  among different  classes of assets in table 10. 
Panel A represents  the base case, corresponding  to the  1985 tax law. 
Panel B represents  the elimination  of interasset tax wedges within the 
corporate  and  noncorporate  sectors. This  can be achieved  by setting 
the  sums  of  the  investment  tax credit  and  the  present  value  of  tax 
deductions  for capital cost recovery at the values specified in the table. 
The  social rates of return and the effective  tax rates must be the same 
for  short-lived  and long-lived  assets within  each sector since the pri- 
vate rate of  return  is the  same  for  all assets within the  sector.  After 
interasset  wedges  are eliminated,  the intersectoral  and intertemporal 
tax wedges  remain. 
In panel C we eliminate  the intersectoral  tax wedges between assets 
in the corporate  and noncorporate  sectors by equalizing social rates of 
return  on  short-lived  assets in the two sectors. Similarly, we equalize TABLE  10 
ELIMINATION  OF TAX  WEDGES:  1985  TAX  LAW 
1.  CAPITAL  STOCK  IN  THE  STEADY  STATE  OF THE  REFERENCE  CASE  (%) 
CORPORATE  NONCORPORATE  HOUSEHOLD 
Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long 
.0893  .2563  .0185  .2580  .0909  .2870 
2.  REMOVAL  OF  CAPITAL  INCOME  TAX  DISTORTIONS 
Social Rate  Effective 
Class of Assets  of  Return  Tax  Rate  ITC  +  T-  Z* 
A.  1985 Tax  Law 
Corporate: 
Short  .0518  .0229  .5395 
Long  .0914  .4460  .3257 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0433  -.1544  .3510 
Long  .0731  .3152  .1409 
Household: 
Short  .0503  .1301  .0000 
Long  .0503  .1301  .0000 
B. No  Within-Sector  Interasset  Wedges 
Corporate: 
Short  .0812  .3762  .4652 
Long  .0812  .3762  .3942 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0711  .2960  .2552 
Long  .0711  .2960  .1641 
Household: 
Short  .0503  .1301  .0000 
Long  .0503  .1301  .0000 
C. No  Intersector  Wedges:  Business  Assets 
Corporate: 
Short  .0504  -  .0052  .5432 
Long  .0822  .3840  .3873 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0504  .0068  .3267 
Long  .0822  .3913  .0341 
Household: 
Short  .0503  .1301  .0000 
Long  .0503  .1301  .0000 
D. No  Intersector  Wedges:  All Sectors 
Corporate: 
Short  .0503  -  .0062  .5433 
Long  .0708  .2844  .4639 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0503  .0058  .3268 
Long  .0708  .2930  .1677 TABLE  10 (Continued) 
Social Rate  Effective 
Class of Assets  of  Return  Tax  Rate  ITC  +  T - Z* 
Household: 
Short  .0503  .1311  -.0002 
Long  .0708  .3821  -.3766 
E. No Tax  Wedges:  All Assets, Business  Sector 
Corporate: 
Short  .0767  .3397  .4766 
Long  .0767  .3397  .4243 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0767  .3476  .2358 
Long  .0767  .3476  .0985 
Household: 
Short  .0503  .1301  .0000 
Long  .0503  .1301  .0000 
F. No  Tax  Wedges:  All Assets, All Sectors 
Corporate: 
Short  .0667  .2408  .5019 
Long  .0667  .2408  .4911 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0667  .2499  .2703 
Long  .0667  .2499  .2152 
Household: 
Short  .0667  .3444  -  .0666 
Long  .0667  .3444  -.3020 
G. Corporate  Tax  Integration:  Apply  Noncorporate 
Social Rates of  Return  to Corporate  Assets 
Corporate: 
Short  .0433  -  .1684  .5610 
Long  .0731  .3069  .4486 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0433  -  .1544  .3510 
Long  .0731  .3152  .1409 
Household: 
Short  .0503  .1301  .0000 
Long  .0503  .1301  .0000 
H. Zero Effective  Tax  Rates 
Corporate: 
Short  .0506  .0000  .5425 
Long  .0506  .0000  .5986 
Noncorporate: 
Short  .0500  .0000  .3279 
Long  .0500  .0000  .4100 
Household: 
Short  .0437  .0000  .0265 
Long  .0437  .0000  .1202 
NOTE.-Steady-state  allocation  of  capital  in the base case is used  as the weights  The  annual  rate of inflation is 
assumed  to be 6 percent 
* Equals investment  tax credit  plus the  tax rate at the firm level times the present  value of capital consumption 
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social rates of  return  on  long-lived  assets. After  the intersectoral  tax 
wedges  within  the  business  sector  are  removed,  the  interasset  tax 
wedges  and intersectoral  wedges  between  the business and household 
sectors still remain.  In panel  D we also eliminate  the intersectoral tax 
wedges  between  business and household  sectors. This approach to tax 
reform  eliminates  all the  intersectoral  tax wedges  but creates  an in- 
terasset tax wedge  in the household  sector where none  existed before 
the change  in tax policy. There  are interasset tax wedges in the corpo- 
rate and  noncorporate  sectors as well. 
In  panel  E, we  eliminate  both  the  interasset  and  intersectoral  tax 
wedges  in  the  business  sector.  Conceptually,  the  tax reforms  repre- 
sented  in  panel  E are a combination  of  the  reforms  represented  in 
panels  B and  C. In panel  F, all the  atemporal  tax wedges  are elimi- 
nated,  so  that  the  only  remaining  sources  of  tax distortions  are the 
intertemporal  tax wedges.  In panel  G, we eliminate  the intersectoral 
tax  wedges  between  corporate  and  noncorporate  sectors  by setting 
the  social  rates  of  return  on  corporate  assets  equal  to  the  corre- 
sponding  rates on  noncorporate  assets. The  substantial reduction  in 
tax revenue  can be offset  by a lump-sum  tax or by proportional  ad- 
justments  in the labor income  tax, sales tax, or individual income  tax. 
Finally, in panel  H,  all the  intertemporal  tax wedges  are eliminated 
and the social and private rates of return are equalized  for all assets. 
C.  Welfare  Impacts 
We summarize  the  welfare  impacts  of  the  eight  hypothetical  tax re- 
form  proposals  in  table  11.  Beginning  with  lump-sum  tax  adjust- 
ments, we find that the welfare gain from elimination  of interasset tax 
wedges  that existed  under  the  1985 tax law would  have been  $443.9 
billion.  The  elimination  of intersectoral  tax wedges  between  assets in 
the corporate  and  noncorporate  sectors yields  welfare  losses instead 
of  gains.  Given  Harberger's  (1966)  analysis of the impact of the cor- 
porate  income  tax, this is a rather surprising  result. The  elimination 
of a tax wedge  would  usually be expected  to increase the efficiency of 
resource  allocation  and improve  the level of economic  welfare.  How- 
ever, the demand  for capital services is much more elastic in the non- 
corporate  sector  than  in  the  corporate  sector.  Equalizing  the  social 
rates  of  return  between  the  corporate  and  noncorporate  assets  re- 
duces  the  total demand  for  the business  capital services. 
The  third change  in tax policy analyzed  in table  11 is the elimina- 
tion of intersectoral  tax wedges  between  household  and business  sec- 
tors.  The  results  suggest  that  there  would  have  been  a  very  large 
potential  welfare  gain from  this change  in tax policy under  the  1985 
tax law. The  estimated  gain is $2,262.6  billion at a 6 percent rate of in- S188  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TABLE  11 
WELFARE  EFFECTS  OF TAX  DISTORTIONS  (Billions of  1987 Dollars) 
1985 Law 
1.  Within-sector  interasset  distortion: 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  443.9 
Labor income  tax adjustment  248.1 
Sales tax adjustment  168.7 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  70.2 
2.  Intersector  distortion:  corporate  and noncorporate  sectors: 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  -93.3 
Labor income  tax adjustment  -416.7 
Sales tax adjustment  -523.8 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  -715.5 
3.  Intersector  distortion:  all sectors: 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  2,262.6 
Labor income  tax adjustment  2,156.9 
Sales tax adjustment  2,118.6 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  2,067.7 
4.  No tax distortion:  corporate  and noncorporate  sectors, all assets: 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  326.4 
Labor income  tax adjustment  69.2 
Sales tax adjustment  -  29.1 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  -  169.7 
5.  No  tax distortion:  all sectors,  all assets: 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  2,663.7 
Labor income  tax adjustment  2,603.9 
Sales tax adjustment  2,572.4 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  2,547.2 
6.  Corporate  tax integration: 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  1,313.1 
Labor income  tax adjustment  493.4 
Sales tax adjustment  238.1 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  -  274.5 
7.  Consumption  tax rules (zero effective  tax rates): 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  3,853.9 
Labor income  tax adjustment  2,045.4 
Sales tax adjustment  1,749.3 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  2,045.4 
8.  Consumption  tax rules  (zero effective  tax rates; 
no sales tax on investment  goods): 
Lump-sum  tax adjustment  4,128.1 
Labor income  tax adjustment  1,988.0 
Sales tax adjustment  1,722.1 
Individual  income  tax adjustment  1,988.0 
NOTE.-Inflation  is fixed  at 6 percent  per year. 
flation. Given the substantial tax wedges  between business and house- 
hold  assets under  the  1985  tax law, this result is not surprising.  For 
example,  the  intersectoral  tax wedges  for short-lived  assets were 0.2 
percent  between  the corporate  and household  sectors and  -  0.7 per- 
cent  between  the  noncorporate  and  household  sectors.  The  corre- 
sponding  figures  for long-lived  assets were 4.2  percent  and  2.3 per- 
cent,  respectively. TAX  REFORM  Si89 
The  welfare  gain from  eliminating  the interasset and intersectoral 
wedges  among  business  assets is estimated  to be only  $326.4  billion 
under  the  1985  tax  law.  The  welfare  gain  from  eliminating  all the 
atemporal  tax  wedges  in  the  private  sector  of  the  U.S.  economy  is 
estimated  to  be  $2,663.7  billion.  This  gain  is much  larger  than  the 
welfare  gain  resulting  from  elimination  of  interasset  distortions 
within each sector and somewhat  larger than that resulting from elim- 
ination  of  intersectoral  tax distortions  for all sectors.  In view of  the 
relative magnitude  of these  effects,  we can attribute most of the wel- 
fare gain to elimination  of intersectoral  tax wedges  between  business 
and  household  assets. 
The  sixth  change  in  tax  policy  we  consider  is the  elimination  of 
intersectoral  tax  wedges  between  assets  in  the  corporate  and  non- 
corporate  sectors.  For this  purpose  we  set social rates of  return  on 
corporate  assets  equal  to  the  corresponding  rates  of  return  on 
noncorporate  assets under  the  1985 tax law. The  effective  tax burden 
on  corporate  assets  is  unambiguously  reduced  by  this  hypothetical 
change  in tax policy. The  estimated  welfare  gain from this change  in 
tax policy is $1,313.1  billion. The  gain is about half of that attainable 
by eliminating  all intersectoral  tax wedges. 
In the six changes  in tax policy we have considered  up to this point, 
we have  focused  attention  on  the  distortionary  impact of  atemporal 
tax  wedges.  We  next  consider  the  elimination  of  intertemporal  tax 
wedges  by  setting  effective  tax  rates  on  all  types  of  income  from 
capital  equal  to zero.  We find  that the  elimination  of  intertemporal 
tax wedges  would  have  generated  huge  welfare  gains  under  lump- 
sum  tax  adjustment.  If  sales  taxes  on  investment  goods  were  also 
abolished,  the welfare  gain would become  even larger. With the 1985 
tax law as the  base  case,  the  welfare  gain  from  removing  intertem- 
poral tax wedges  on all assets would  have been  $3,853.9  billion. The 
elimination  of  the  sales taxes  on  investment  goods  would  have  pro- 
duced  a gain of  $4,128.1  billion. 
The  magnitudes  of welfare gains from elimination  of the intertem- 
poral  tax  wedges  under  distortionary  tax adjustments  presented  in 
table  11 are substantially  lower  than  those  under  lump-sum  tax ad- 
justment.  The  changes  in marginal  tax rates required  to offset  reve- 
nue  losses  can  generate  significant  substitution  effects.  The  welfare 
effects  resulting  from the elimination  of intertemporal  tax wedges,  as 
given  in table  11, are also sensitive to the choice among  distortionary 
tax adjustments  since the required  increase in tax revenue  is so large. 
If  a proposed  tax  reform  is roughly  revenue  neutral,  so that the 
magnitude  of  the  required  adjustment  in  tax  revenue  is small,  the 
welfare  ranking  of  alternative  policy  changes  does  not  depend  on 
the method  for adjusting  tax revenue.  For a change  in tax policy that 
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tax revenues  through  base broadening,  the welfare  measures  under 
the lump-sum  tax adjustment  can be interpreted  as upper  bounds  of 
the  welfare  gains  that  can be  achieved.  Any  realistic tax reform  in- 
volving  revenue  adjustment  through  changes  in distortionary  taxes 
would  result  in  welfare  gains  well below  those  attainable under  the 
hypothetical  lump-sum  tax adjustment. 
The  fact that the  estimated  welfare  gains  from  the elimination  of 
the  intertemporal  tax wedges  is in  the  range  of  $4  trillion  suggests 
that the  potential  welfare  gain  from  replacing  the current  system of 
income  taxes  with consumption-based  taxes  would  be very large  in- 
deed.  However,  the welfare gains would be reduced  by approximately 
half under  the more realistic assumption  that revenue  losses are offset 
by distortionary  tax adjustments.  These  welfare gains are still impres- 
sive. 
Our  second  conclusion  is that  the  consequences  in  reductions  of 
intertemporal  tax wedges  associated with consumption-based  taxation 
must  be  carefully  weighed  against  possible  worsening  of  atemporal 
resource  allocation  as  a  consequence  of  distortions  associated  with 
increased  taxes  on  consumption.  An  idealized  income  tax  with  in- 
come  from  household  assets  incorporated  into  the  tax base  would 
have  permitted  substantial  reductions  in  tax  rates  on  income  from 
business  assets.  Such  a  tax  would  have  produced  greater  potential 
gains in welfare  than an idealized  consumption  tax, with the  1985 tax 
law taken  as a starting  point.  Harberger's  case for uniform  tax rates 
on all types of capital income  is strengthened  by this finding,  provid- 
ing  that  uniform  treatment  is not  limited  to  income  from  business 
assets. 
V.  Conclusion 
The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  increases  the  effective  marginal  tax 
burden  on  income  from  capital at any positive  inflation  rate. None- 
theless,  the change  in economic  welfare  relative to the  1985 tax law is 
positive.  The  1986  tax act improves  the  efficiency  of  atemporal  re- 
source  allocation  sufficiently  to offset  the negative  impact of  greater 
effective  tax rates on capital income.  Higher  rates of inflation result in 
a marked  reduction  in the  welfare  gains  from  the  1986  tax reform. 
For example,  we estimate  that the welfare  gain is $448.4  billion at a 6 
percent  rate of inflation, which amounts  to 2.8 percent of U.S. private 
national  wealth  in  1987.  The  1986  tax act substantially  reduces  in- 
terasset  tax wedges  within  the  business  sector,  so that potential  wel- 
fare  gains  from  further  reductions  are small. 
An important  feature  of  the Treasury  and president's  proposals  is 
that the  tax base would  have  been  largely  indexed  against  inflation. TAX  REFORM  Si91 
By  contrast  the  tax burden  on  income  from  capital under  the  Tax 
Reform  Act of  1986  increases  significantly with the rate of inflation. 
While the gains from  the  1986 tax act are comparable  to those under 
the  Treasury  and  president's  proposals  at inflation  rates near  zero, 
the gains  under  the  two proposals  are much  greater  at moderate  or 
high  rates of  inflation.  For example,  the president's  proposal  would 
have resulted  in a welfare  gain of $2,452.2  billion at a 6 percent infla- 
tion rate, which dwarfs the corresponding  gain from the Tax Reform 
Act of  1986. 
However,  the  largest  welfare  gains  from  tax  reform  would  have 
been  obtained  by  transferring  part  of  the  tax  burden  on  business 
capital to household  capital. There  are obviously  important  political 
obstacles  to such a transfer.  Limitations on the deductibility of mort- 
gage interest and elimination  of the tax deductibility of state and local 
property  taxes  were  included  in  the  Treasury  proposal.  However, 
only very modest restrictions on the deductibility of mortgage  interest 
survived into the 1986 tax reform legislation. The welfare gain from a 
tax policy that treats all forms of capital income  symmetrically would 
have been  $2,663.7  billion at a 6 percent  inflation  rate. This  exceeds 
the  gain  from  the  1986  tax act by $2,215.3  billion and outranks  the 
gains  from  both  the Treasury  and  president's  proposals. 
An  alternative  approach  to  equalizing  the  tax  burdens  between 
business  and  household  assets would  have  been  to replace  the  1985 
tax law with a tax system based on consumption.  At a 6 percent infla- 
tion  rate the  welfare  gain  from  shifting  to a consumption-based  tax 
system  from  a system  primarily  based  on  income  would  have  been 
much  larger  than  the  gain  from  the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986.  This 
conclusion  holds  for any of  the alternative  methods  we have consid- 
ered  for  maintaining  government  revenue  at the  same level  as that 
under  the  1985  tax  law.  The  prospective  revenue  losses  associated 
with elimination  of capital income  taxation would have required large 
increases  in distortionary  taxes. However,  the resulting welfare losses 
would  have been  outweighed  by gains in efficiency  from eliminating 
capital income  taxes. 
Our overall  conclusion  is that indexing  the U.S.  tax system should 
receive  high  priority in future  tax reforms.  Although  potential  gains 
in  welfare  from  the  Tax  Reform  Act of  1986  are substantial,  these 
gains are sharply diminished  at moderate  rates of inflation. The Trea- 
sury and president's  proposals can provide important guidance  in the 
practical  implementation  of  indexing  schemes.  A  properly  indexed 
tax  system  based  on  income  may be  superior  to a system  based  on 
consumption,  provided  that  income  from  household  assets  is  in- 
cluded  in the tax base and all assets are taxed at a uniform  rate. This 
is a second  important  priority for future  tax reforms. S192  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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